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Parties and their elites play an important role in shaping public opinion towards European integration. As
determinants of party support for European integration the literature has identiﬁed ideological and strategic
electoral motives. In this article we examine the impact of economic factors on party support for European
integration. We ﬁnd that party support from right-wing parties is larger in countries with greater ﬁnancial
beneﬁts from the EU budget. On the contrary, beneﬁts from trade creation by the introduction of the euro as
a common currency shows no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on party support. In the period after the introduction of the
euro we ﬁnd that right-wing parties where much more Eurosceptical than left-wing parties when their country
did not fulﬁll the Maastricht debt or deﬁcit criteria. We also observe more support for European integration by
left-wing parties in countries that would beneﬁt from welfare state convergence due to European integration.
While our analysis indicates that diﬀerent economic factors always have been important to explain party support
for European integration, we also ﬁnd that, in the period after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, these motives have
gained importance at the expense of the ideological motives.




The European Union (EU) represents a unique process of economic and political integration in recent
history. Never since World War II have sovereign countries renounced their competencies on economic
and political issues to such a great extent as in the process of European integration.1 Throughout
most of this process there seemed to be a consensus that more integration was beneﬁcial for all EU
members. As a consequence, the European Union has assumed more and more competences from its
member countries and has steadily gained new members. So, the EU grew from 6 countries in 1952 to
28 in 2013. However, scepticism of citizen on the beneﬁts from European integration has also grown in
many member countries. Thus, the United Kingdom has become the ﬁrst member country to leave the
EU after the referendum in 2016, where a majority voted against remaining in the EU. But since the
last decade criticism had already grown in numerous other member countries. For example, in 2005
France and the Netherlands rejected the EU constitution in a referendum. As a consequence, in six
other EU member countries this referendum was cancelled or postponed indeﬁnitely. Even in Spain,
a country in which support for European integration traditionally has been considerable, recently, the
supporters of the EU have become the minority for the ﬁrst time.2
The literature has shown that parties and their elites play an important role in shaping public
opinion towards European integration (De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Steen-
bergen et al., 2007; among others). But what are the determinants of party support for European
integration? Here, the literature has focused basically on two kinds of determinants. The ﬁrst of these
is party ideology or identity, which has been found to be related to parties’ positioning on European
integration according to an inverted U-relationship, with central parties being pro-integrationist and
extreme parties being Euro-sceptical (Aspinwall, 2002; Hellstro¨m, 2008; Hix, 1999; Hix and Lord,
1997; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks and Steenbergen, 2002; Marks and Wil-
son, 2000; Marks et al., 2002). The second class of determinants of party support that the literature
has considered are related to parties’ electoral strategies. While well-established parties occupying
the ideological centre follow the mainstream and take median voter positions on European integra-
tion, peripheral parties try to attract unsatisﬁed voters by taking more radical positions (Hellstro¨m,
2008). Thus, parties in government which have been widely responsible for advances in the European
integration process are found to be more pro-integrationist than parties in the opposition. The same
is true for parties with greater electoral success while minority extreme parties are found to be more
sceptical towards European integration (Hellstro¨m, 2008; Marks et al., 2002).
In this article we extend the analysis of parties’ strategic choice of positioning towards European
integration by studying the role of economic factors that have yet not been considered explicitly in the
literature.3 This is surprising for two reasons. First, as the EU is primarily an economic union that
has been designed to facilitate trade and market integration, economic factors should be considered
as important determinants of support for European integration. Second, apart from national and
ideological identity considerations, utilitarian motives captured by economic variables have been found
1Other examples in which countries have renounced to economic competencies are the foundation of supra-state
institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). How
the creation of supranational institutions has limited the inﬂuence of parties in OECD countries on social expenditure,
for example, has been analyzed recently by Herwartz and Theilen (2014).
2See Pew Research Center (2013), a summary of the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey.
3Of course, economic factors are also related with ideological party positions and, therefore, to some extent also
implicitly considered in previous studies. Moreover, recent studies on the eﬀects of the Eurozone crisis have shown that
economic factors are more and more determinant for voting behaviour in the European parliament (Braghiroli, 2015;
Otjes and Van der Veer, 2016).
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to play a role in studies on public opinion formation about the European integration process (Anderson
and Reichert, 1996; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Christin, 2005; Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2006; Eichenberg
and Dalton, 1993; Garry and Tilley, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2004), and, therefore,
should also inﬂuence party positions on European integration.
That economic factors might indeed inﬂuence party positioning towards European integration can
be seen from Figure 1. We observe that party support from parties of the same ideological spectrum
but from diﬀerent countries varies with the country’s direct monetary beneﬁts from EU membership
or its debt and inequality position relative to the EU median. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that these
variations also depend on party ideology, i.e., aﬀect diﬀerently left-wing and right-wing parties, and
that the impact of these economic variables on party positioning towards European integration may
have changed over time. To uncover the political and economic determinants that have driven party
support for European integration over the last three decades, we use data from 297 political parties
in 24 countries collected in nine waves (1984 - 2014) to test ﬁve hypotheses. The ﬁrst hypothesis
refers to ideological and electoral strategy motives that have already been proved to inﬂuence party
contestation over European integration (for example, see Hellstro¨m, 2008 and Marks et al., 2002).
The remaining hypotheses are new and analyze the channel through which economic factors inﬂuence
parties’ strategies regarding their choice of support for European integration. As such factors we
consider, ﬁrst, the direct and indirect economic and monetary beneﬁts. Second, we analyse whether
the extent to which parties’ countries were aﬀected by European regulation has inﬂuenced their support
for European integration. Finally, we test whether distributional eﬀects of European integration have
inﬂuenced party support.
Our results indicate that economic factors indeed play a crucial role to explain party support for
European integration. Firstly, we obtain that party support from right-wing parties is larger in those
countries in which the payments from the EU exceed the contributions to the EU budget. On the
contrary, the indirect beneﬁts through trade creation from the adoption of the euro as a common
currency have not signiﬁcantly increased support for European integration. Secondly, we ﬁnd that
debt and deﬁcit control agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty has had considerable impact on party
support for European integration after 2002. Speciﬁcally, the non-compliance of debt and/or deﬁcit
criteria has increased Euroscepticism of right-wing parties. Furthermore, our results indicate that
parties in countries with inequality diﬀerences are more in favour of European integration. This is
particularly the case for left-wing parties. We can also conclude that in the period after the ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008 and under the ongoing sovereign debt crisis economic motives have gained importance
at the expense of ideological motives.
Apart from the novelty of analysing the relevance of economic factors to the party support for
European integration, this paper makes two other contributions to the literature. First, while previous
studies have usually used pooled data and have assumed cross-sectional homogeneity (and, thus,
neglected diﬀerences in the importance of the relationship at diﬀerent times), our analysis is based
on cross-sectional estimation, which controls for time-speciﬁc eﬀects. This allows to account for
the changing focuses of European integration (single market, common currency, EU enlargement,
ﬁscal harmonization, etc.) and the context of this process (ﬁnancial crisis, sovereign debt crisis, etc.).
Second, our study includes a larger set of countries and more time periods, which provides new insights
into the evolution of party support over time and of party positioning on European integration in new
EU member countries.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the hypotheses subjected
to empirical testing. Section 3 introduces the data and outlines the estimation procedure. Results
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are discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 the results are summarized and their relevance is
discussed.
2 Hypotheses
A party’s ﬁnal objective is to maximize electoral support so that it can implement its policies. Accord-
ing to Hix and Lord (1997) and Taggart (1998), major parties support European integration because
their positioning in favour of mainstream policy issues allows them to minimize intra-party tensions.
Therefore, parties protect the status quo with a neutral position on European integration on which
they might be internally divided (Marks et al., 2002; Parsons and Weber, 2011; Van de Wardt et
al., 2014). Minor parties take advantage of the resulting convergence of the policy positions of ma-
jor parties by formulating extreme positions on European integration in an attempt to attract votes
from Euro-scepticals or to promote Eurosceptisism (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008; De Vries
and Edwards, 2009; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). In the case of radical left-wing parties they oppose
EU integration because of its ‘neoliberal’ character (March, 2011), while radical right-wing parties
oppose Europe integration because it yields a loss of national sovereignty and identity (Mudde, 2007).
The success of radical parties in turn inﬂuences party positioning regarding the support of European
integration of mainstream parties (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Thus, Meijers (2017) ﬁnds that “the
centre-left is more aﬀected by Eurosceptic contagion as it is inﬂuenced by both radical right and radi-
cal left Eurosceptic success, whereas the centreright is only susceptible to radical right success”. This
aﬀects not only their overall positioning towards European integration but also the emphasis of new
issues (Abou-Chadi, 2014). In this context, we analyze how economic factors have inﬂuenced party
support for European integration. Our analysis is based on ﬁve hypotheses. The ﬁrst hypothesis refers
to the ideological and strategic electoral motives that have already been analysed in the literature:
H1: Ideology and strategic electoral motives determine the party position regarding European inte-
gration. Party support and ideology follow an inverted U-shape relationship and mainstream
parties are supporters of European integration.
This hypothesis follows Marks et al. (2002) in assuming that parties are organizations with em-
bedded ideologies that are grounded on ‘Weltanschauungen’ that constitute the basis for their po-
sitioning towards European integration. In particular, as far as European integration is concerned,
party positioning is often related to the historical role that parties played in this integration process.
According to the literature, party positioning on the issue of European integration can be located in
a two dimensional space (Hellstro¨m, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2010; Marks and
Steenbergen, 2002; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks et al., 2002). One
dimension measures parties’ economic position on market organization (from regulated capitalism to
neo-liberalism) and the other considers the extent to which decision making is centralized (from re-
gionalism to a supranationalism). While these two dimensions are in principle independent, they are
sometimes closely related to each other and highly correlated to the party position on an ideological
left/right dimension. Thus, extreme left- and right-wing parties are strongly opposed to European
integration; social democratic and conservative parties are generally moderately in favour; and liberal
parties are strongly in favour. This results in an inverted U-shaped relationship between ideology
(left-right position in the general ideological spectrum) and party support for European integration
(Hellstro¨m, 2008; Marks et al., 2002). Furthermore, mainstream parties with higher electoral support
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that have often been in government and which can be made responsible for the current state of Eu-
ropean integration have a more favourable position towards European integration than minor radical
parties that were mostly excluded from government (Marks et al., 2002; Hobolt and De Vries, 2012).
With the next hypotheses we contribute to the literature by considering how economic factors
inﬂuence parties’ strategic choice of support for European integration. Speciﬁcally, we analyse whether
the economic costs and beneﬁts of European integration have an inﬂuence on party positioning in
favour or against European integration in diﬀerent member countries. The economic dimension of
European integration plays an important role in party positioning on this issue as can be seen from
party manifestos (De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2002). While right-
wing parties highlight the economic beneﬁts from European integration by market liberalization,
left-wing parties value European integration by its consequences on inequality. Moreover, the loss
of sovereignty that goes along with European integration because of the loss of control on national
policies situates extreme parties (both on the left and the right of the ideological spectrum) as opposed
to European integration. In the empirical part of this paper, we take these diﬀerences in party
evaluations of the economic consequences of European integration into account by interacting our
economic performance variables with party ideology.
Our second hypothesis considers the direct economic beneﬁts of European integration that have
also been found to have a positive inﬂuence on citizen support for European integration (Anderson
and Reichert, 1996; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Garry and Tilley, 2009;
Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2004).
H2: Parties’ positioning regarding European integration depends positively on the ﬁnancial net ben-
eﬁts from integration with a larger eﬀect for right-wing parties.
These beneﬁts can be measured in various ways. As an initial measure, we consider the diﬀerence
between the member countries’ contribution payments to the EU budget and the expenditure of the
EU in these countries. While these (net) expenditures are obviously only a part of the economic
beneﬁts of EU membership, they need to be taken into account for several reasons. On the one hand,
both the contributions to the EU budget and the EU expenditures in member countries are the result
of extensive negotiations between member countries. For example, the UK corrections, which reduced
the contributions of the UK to the EU budget, were agreed to by the 1984 Fontainebleau European
Council after long negotiations. Their press coverage and role in the national elections made voters in
member countries more aware of the ﬁnancial beneﬁts and costs of European integration. Therefore,
the position of voters regarding European integration should depend on these beneﬁts and costs and,
as a consequence, party positions towards European integration should also depend on them. On the
other hand, because of limited rationality, voters tend to give greater value to direct costs and beneﬁts
rather than the indirect costs and beneﬁts of European integration, which are, furthermore, much
more diﬃcult to measure. Thus, both voters and parties will give more importance to the ﬁnancial
costs and beneﬁts than to other advantages and disadvantages of European integration. We expect
this eﬀect to be more pronounced for right-wing parties as these especially highlight the economic
beneﬁts from European integration.
Another important advance in European integration has been the creation of the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU). We state our third hypothesis as:
H3: Parties’ positioning regarding European integration depends positively on the economic beneﬁts
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through EMU induced trade creation with a more notable eﬀect for right-wing parties.
An important argument in favour of the EMU is that a common market with a common currency
increases trade among EMU member countries. According to Frankel and Rose (2002), the formation
of a currency union allows member countries to triple trade with other currency member countries
without diverging trade from non-member countries. They also ﬁnd that, in the mid-run, a percent
increase in total trade raises income per capita by one-third of a percent. This means that the economic
beneﬁts from the EMU should be substantial, particularly for large and centrally located economies
that, according to the gravity model of trade, should obtain the largest beneﬁts. Therefore, as a
second measure of economic beneﬁts, we consider a country’s beneﬁts from EMU induced trade which
should be positively related to party positioning in favour of European integration in these countries.
One might expect voters hardly to be aware of these indirect beneﬁts and that they, therefore, should
have no signiﬁcant impact on party support for European integration. However, ﬁrms will be aware
of these beneﬁts and will through their ﬁnancial support to parties intent also to convince voters that
European integration is beneﬁcial. In line with this reasoning, total trade, as a measure related to the
one used in this study, has been found to have a positive inﬂuence on citizens’ support for European
integration in Anderson and Reichert (1996), Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and McLaren (2004). As
before, this eﬀect should be stronger for right-wing parties.
The fourth hypothesis we formulate considers the impact of the centralization of decision making
implied by European integration on party support for this process.
H4: Party support for European integration decreases with the degree by which the party’s country
is aﬀected by supranational regulation.
As mentioned above, European integration implies the centralization of decision making. New
supranational institutions assume competencies that formerly belonged to the governments of the
member countries and, therefore, were under the control of national parties. This has especially
aﬀected economic competencies. The Maastricht criteria in 1992 were a ﬁrst attempt to control gov-
ernment deﬁcits and debt and, thereby, government spending at the national level. Another example
is the creation of the EMU and the introduction of the euro, which delegated the control of the mone-
tary policy in EMU member countries from national institutions to a supranational institution. With
hypothesis 4 we analyse whether party positioning regarding European integration has changed in
those countries that have been especially aﬀected by the control of supranational European institu-
tions.4 We use the Maastricht criteria to analyse whether the creation of supranational institutions
had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on party positioning towards European integration in those countries with
excessive budget deﬁcits and debt, and which did not fulﬁl the three percent deﬁcit criterion or the
60 percent debt criterion.
Finally, our ﬁfth hypothesis is:
H5: Party support for European integration is larger (smaller) in countries with more (less) income
inequality. This eﬀect is particularly relevant for the support of left-wing parties.
4The role of supranational institutional change on the inﬂuence of party ideology on social expenditure has recently
been analysed by Herwartz and Theilen (2014). They ﬁnd that, indeed, the creation of supranational institutions has
limited the inﬂuence of parties on social spending in the OECD during the last two decades.
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As European integration means the convergence of member economies through trade, labour and
capital market liberalization, we could interpret advances in European integration also as a reduction
of inequality diﬀerences among EU member countries. This convergence of countries might cause
a reduction (increase) of welfare standards in economies with larger (smaller) welfare states and,
therefore, as suggested by Brinegar and Jolly (2005), increase the opposition (support) of parties to
European integration in these countries. As a reduction of inequality is particularly relevant in the
programmes of left-wing parties, we expect this eﬀect to be stronger for left-wing parties than for
right-wing parties.
3 Data description and methodology
Our analysis is based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey which merges four data sets: Bakker et al.
(2012), Hooghe et al. (2010), Polk et al. (2017) and Ray (1999). We use the data from nine waves
of surveys (1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014) for 24 member countries of
the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom, for all years; Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia since 2002; and Estonia since
2006). The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains evaluations by political scientists (experts) about
party positions regarding European integration of major and minor parties in the experts’ native
country. The number of experts’ responses depends on the year of the survey and ranges from 135
in 1984, with an average of 8 experts per country, to 337 in 2014, with an average of 12 experts per
country. Because parties enter and exit, and several countries were included after 2002, our database
is an unbalanced panel with a total of 268 diﬀerent parties and 1415 observations with approximately
10 parties per country and year.5
Our dependent variable is party support for European integration, which measures party positions
towards the European integration process in the year of the survey as the mean of the experts’ indi-
vidual rankings. European integration is a categorical variable that ranges from 1, strongly opposed,
to 7, strongly in favour. Although the experts’ answers are integer numbers, our dependent variable,
as the mean of their evaluations, usually is not an integer.
To test hypothesis 1, as in Hellstro¨m (2008) and Marks et al. (2002), we use Ideology which
is a categorical variable that measures parties’ general ideological position from 0, extreme left, to
10, extreme right. As in Hellstro¨m (2008), we also consider this variable in squared form (Ideology
Squared), since the relationship between party support for European integration and ideology is non-
linear (radical parties at both ends of the ideological spectrum tend to be more Euro-sceptical than
central parties).6 To test the importance of mainstream parties, we use Mainstream Party which takes
value one when the party has more than 15% vote share, and zero otherwise.7
5See Bakker et al. (2012), Hooghe et al. (2010), Polk et al. (2017) and Ray (1999) for more details on the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey and the distribution of parties over countries and years.
6The inverted U-form can be estimated with a second-order polynomial: European Integration = β0+β1Ideology+
β2 (Ideology)
2, where β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. Notice that support for European integration has its maximum at Ideology =
−β1/(2β2) and, by deﬁnition, support by an extreme left-wing party is β0 and by an extreme right-wing party is
β0 + 10 (β1 + 10β2).
7We have also used Government participation, a dummy that takes value one for parties that are in oﬃce during the
year of the survey, 0.5 (for both outgoing parties and entering parties) if there is a change of government in the survey
year, and 0 otherwise. This measurement is diﬀerent from Marks et al. (2002) whose variable takes value one when a
party has participated in government at least once in the period 1965-1995. Furthermore, similar to Hellstro¨m (2008),
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Hypothesis 2 is contrasted with EU Net Expenditure which is the diﬀerence between a country’s
contributions to the EU budget and EU expenditure in this country.8 It is measured as a share of
GDP in percentage points.
The variable used to test hypothesis 3 is Trade Beneﬁts which are the beneﬁts from EMU mem-
bership induced trade as a share of GDP quoted in percentage points.9 To calculate Trade Beneﬁts
we ﬁrst estimate the linear trend in trade per GDP between EMU member countries for each of these
countries before the introduction of the euro (from 1995 to 2001). Then, we calculate the diﬀerences
between the observed trade and the forecasted trade for a ﬁctitious scenario without the euro based
on our trend estimates for the period before 2001.10 Finally, following Frankel and Rose (2002) who
estimated the welfare eﬀects of currency unions, we assume that a one percent increase in a country’s
overall trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita by at least one-third of a percent. Per deﬁni-
tion, Trade Beneﬁts are non-negative and, for EMU non-member countries, zero. We consider Trade
Beneﬁts after the adoption of the euro (i.e., when a country introduces euro banknotes and coins).
To test the inﬂuence of the adoption of the Maastricht criteria in 1992 on party support for
European integration, i.e., hypothesis 4, we use a dichotomous variable. Maastricht Non-Compliance
take value one when government debt and/or deﬁcit do not fulﬁll the Maastricht criteria, i.e., are
more than 60% of GDP and/or more than 3% of GDP, respectively. We include this variables for the
period starting in 1992.11
To test hypothesis 5, the inﬂuence of the size of the welfare state on party contestation over
European integration, we use Inequality. Inequality is measured by the GINI index which ranges
from 0, perfect equality, to 100, perfect inequality. Table A.2 shows that Inequality varies between 20
(Finland in 1988 and 1992, and Sweden 1984 and 1988) and 39 (Greece in 1984 and Latvia in 2006),
respectively.
Finally, to account for business cycle eﬀects, we use Growth Cycle and Unemployment Cycle.
Growth Cycle measures the diﬀerence between a country’s annual real per capita income growth
rate and its trend. Similarly, Unemployment Cycle is the diﬀerence between a country’s annual
unemployment rate and its trend. In both cases country-speciﬁc trends are calculated with the HP-
ﬁlter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
Table A.1 summarizes the measurement of the variables and gives detailed information on the
sources from which the data is obtained. Table A.2 gives some details on descriptive statistics. We
observe that there is considerable heterogeneity among countries and parties. For example, EU Net
Expenditure varies from -0.96 (a net contribution of 0.96% of GDP for the Netherlands in 2014) to
we have used Electoral Support which is measured as a party’s share of total votes in the last national parliamentary
elections before the survey year in percentage points. As all these variables are highly correlated with Mainstream Party,
we use them alternatively to check the robustness of hypothesis 1. The results are rather similar and available from the
authors.
8We also include in EU Net Expenditure transfers from the EU to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia before these countries were EU members.
9Notice that measuring trade as a share of GDP automatically accounts for business cycle ﬂuctuations.
10The estimated eﬀects of EMU-induced trade are in line with the predictions of the gravity model. Thus, trade
beneﬁts are highest for centrally located and large economies (Germany), medium for small centrally located economies
(Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands) and large but more peripheral economies (France, Italy, Spain) and almost
non-existent for small peripheral countries (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal). Furthermore, for a control group of EMU
non-member countries (Denmark, Sweden, UK), there are no eﬀects of EMU induced trade.
11As an alternative measure we use simultaneaous non-compliance of the debt and deﬁcit criteria which yields similar
results available from the authors.
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6.66 (a net receipt of 6.66 % of GDP for Greece in 1984). Heterogeneity of party support for European
integration can also be observed in Figure 1 which display the distribution of party support for diﬀerent
survey years conditional on some economic variables. While we ﬁnd an inverse U-shape relationship
between party support for European integration and positioning on the general left-right ideology in
all panels, we observe that this relationship changes over time and depends on diﬀerent economic
factors. As mentioned above, we regard this as an indicator for the relevance of economic factors as
an explanation for the observed heterogeneity in party support for European integration. In the next
section we comment on the detailed analysis of this question.
4 Results
As the inﬂuence of economic variables on party support for European integration is most likely to have
changed over time, our analysis is based on cross-sectional OLS estimation for nine years available in
the CHES-survey. Furthermore, we estimate a panel data model based on the full dataset clustering
by time. The estimation results are displayed in Table 1. In what follows, we comment in detail on
the estimation results regarding the hypotheses raised in Section 2.
Though our sample includes ﬁve more waves of expert surveys and nearly twice the number of
countries, our results in the ﬁrst two rows of Table 1 conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Marks et al. (2002) and
Hellstro¨m (2008). Radical parties on the extremes of the general ideological spectrum are opposed
to European integration, while centrally located parties (liberal, Christian democratic and social
democratic parties) widely support it. This gives rise to an inverted U-shape relationship between
party support for European integration and left-right positioning on the general ideology. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that this relationship has been largely stable over the whole sample period. However, for the
years after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 (i.e. 2010 and 2014) general support for European integration has
reduced by more than 1 point for the overall Ideology. From Table 1 we observe thatMainstream Party
has a signiﬁcant and considerable inﬂuence on party support since 1988. The support of mainstream
parties is between 0.41 and 0.84 points larger compared to that of other parties.12 Overall, the results
lead us to accept hypothesis 1 of the importance of ideological motives for party support for European
integration.
With hypothesis 2 we test whether the direct economic beneﬁts and costs of EU membership
inﬂuence party support for European integration. Regarding the inﬂuence of EU Net Expenditure we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of this variable in most periods which, however, depends also on party Ideology.
Right-wing parties turn out to care more about direct economic beneﬁts from EU net expenditure
than their left-wing counterparts. To get an impression of the size of the estimated eﬀects consider the
variation in support for European integration of three parties located at positions 3 (‘moderate left’),
5 (‘centrist’) and 7 (‘moderate right’) of the ideological spectrum in two diﬀerent countries: a country
that net contributes 0.5% of its GDP to the EU budget and a country that net receives 0.5% of its
GDP from the EU budget. The estimates in rows 4 and 5 in Table 1 for 2006, for example, indicate
that the eﬀect is almost no variation in support in case of the moderate left-wing party, an increase of
support by 0.4 from the centrist party and an increase of support by 0.9 from the moderate right-wing
party if we compare a party in a net contributor country with a party of the same ideology in a net
12Using Government Participation as an alternative measure of strategic electoral motives of party support for Euro-
pean integration we ﬁnd similar results. Support for European integration of parties with government participation is
between 0.4 and 1.3 points larger than the support of parties that are in opposition. The detailed results are available
upon request from the authors.
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receiver country. Again, we ﬁnd a substantial change for the years after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008.
Thus, the 2010 and 2014 estimates indicate that EU Net Expenditure has completely lost its inﬂuence
on party support for European integration. Overall, these results lead us to accept hypothesis 2 for
the years before the crisis.
Hypothesis 3 is contrasted with Trade Beneﬁts stemming from the creation of the European Mone-
tary Union. While the estimation results indicate that these beneﬁts have a small positive inﬂuence in
the year of the introduction of the euro in 2002, the eﬀect is non-signiﬁcant in other years. The panel
estimation results show no diﬀerence regarding the importance of trade beneﬁts between left-wing and
right-wing parties. Regarding the size of the eﬀect, considering the estimates for the whole sample in
the last column of Table 1, we ﬁnd only a muted eﬀect as even in the country with the overall highest
trade beneﬁts from monetary integration (Belgium in 2006 with a trade beneﬁt of 8.28% of GDP) the
support for European integration of a moderate left-wing party is by only 0.41 points higher than in
a country with no trade beneﬁts (the UK or Denmark, for example). For a centrist party the eﬀect
is even lower (0.18) and, contrary to our predictions, for a moderate right-wing party the eﬀect is
almost non-existent (-0.05). This indicates that these indirect beneﬁts from European integration,
contrary to the direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts, are of much less importance. This might be due either to the
lack of awareness of these beneﬁts to the general public or to the fact that these beneﬁts are taken as
granted once they are achieved and do not inﬂuence further party support for European integration.
Therefore, we would not accept hypothesis 3, i.e., the importance of indirect economic beneﬁts to
party support for European integration, because we ﬁnd no sizeable eﬀect even in case of left-wing
parties in countries with highest trade beneﬁts.
insert Table 1 Determinants of European Integration around here
For the impact of Maastricht Non-Compliance on party support for European integration we
ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of this variable has varied over time. We can distinguish two periods. In
the period post-Maastricht and before the introduction of the euro (1992, 1996, 1999, 2002) we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the violation of the Maastricht debt and deﬁcit criteria on party support for
European integration. This result is not surprising as during this period non-compliance of the criteria
had no consequences. For example, in 1996, all countries did not fulﬁll at least one of the two criteria.
In the second period, after the introduction of the euro (2006, 2010, 2014), we observe considerable
diﬀerences in party support for European integration regarding the evaluation of debt and deﬁcit
non-compliance. The estimates in Table 1 for 2006 indicate that while moderate left-wing parties
increase support by 0.54 in case of non-compliance, moderate right-wing parties reduce support by
0.34. For 2010 and 2014, after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, diﬀerences in the impact of Maastricht Non-
Compliance between a moderate left-wing and a moderate right-wing party are even more pronounced
(1.40 and -0.30 for 2010, and 0.96 and -0.23 for 2014, respectively). These results lead us to accept
hypothesis 4 for the second period in the case of right-wing parties. By contrast, for left-wing parties
we obtain the opposite result, i.e., support for European integration increases in the case of budgetary
and or debt problems that lead to non-compliance with one of the Maastricht criteria.
Regarding hypothesis 5, we ﬁnd that Inequality has a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on party support
for European integration in almost all years. Furthermore we ﬁnd that the impact of Inequality as a
determinant of party support for European integration decreases when we move to the right of the
ideological spectrum. The estimates for 1992 displayed in Table 1 indicate that a 10 point increase in
the Gini index (the diﬀerence between Finland and France or between Germany and Ireland that year,
for example) increases party support for European integration from a moderate left-wing party more
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than 1 point, from a centrist party by 0.4, while it has a slightly negative eﬀect on support from a
moderate right-wing party by -0.3. However, for the years after the 2008 crisis, left-wing parties start
to be more opposed to European integration than their right-wing counterparts in those countries
with lower welfare standards where the eﬀect also has lost some of its importance. Therefore, at least
for the period before 2008, we accept hypothesis 5.
Regarding the variables that control for the inﬂuence of the business cycle we obtain that Growth
Cycle and Unemployment Cycle are in most of the periods insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level. Regarding the year eﬀects in the full sample estimation it turns out that only in 1992 and 2002
support has been signiﬁcantly above that of the base year 1984 (by 0.4 points).
Summarizing our results we obtain that, apart from ideological motives, economic factors have
always played an important role in shaping parties’ strategy regarding their support for European
integration. In the period before the 2008 crisis a country’s net balance regarding EU contributions
and payments has been the main economic factor in determining party support, particularly from
right-wing parties. After the crisis the main economic factor for party support has been the impact of
EU control of budget deﬁcits and sovereign debt. Furthermore, for the period after the ﬁnancial crisis
in 2008 and under the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, economic motives have become more important
at the expense of the ideological motives. Finally, while economic beneﬁts from EMU induced trade
creation have been substantial in some member countries, they have only played a negligible role for
party support for European integration.
5 Conclusions
In this article we study whether, apart from ideological and strategic electoral motives, economic
factors also inﬂuence party support for European integration. We ﬁnd evidence for the importance
of diﬀerent economic factors as determinants of party support for European integration. Before the
economic crisis in 2008 the most important variables to explain party support for European integration
are party position on the general left-right ideology, EU net expenditure and diﬀerences in income
inequality. After the crisis, party ideology has lost a substantial part of its inﬂuence and EU net
expenditure and diﬀerences in income inequality play almost no role any more. By contrast, the
extent to which countries are aﬀected by the Maastricht criteria has gained considerable importance
after the crisis where its inﬂuence on parties’ European integration support depends on the party’s
ideology. Interestingly, this result is in line with recent studies on the eﬀect of the economic crisis on
voting behaviour in the European Parliament. Braghiroli (2015) obtains that the explanatory content
of party ideology has become residual while voting behaviour after the crisis is determined by whether
the costs and beneﬁts presented by possible ways out of the crisis are considered as acceptable. In the
same vein, Otjes and Van der Veer (2016) ﬁnd that the Eurozone crisis has ampliﬁed the importance of
the pro-/anti-EU dimension at the expense of the left-right dimension that traditionally has dominated
the policy space in the European Parliament whereby this change is particularly pronounced for voting
on economic issues.
Our results have some interesting policy implications for the future of the European integration
process in particular and for processes of economic integration in general. First, as party support for
European integration depends on economic factors, future advances in the European integration pro-
cess will depend crucially on the economic beneﬁts and their distribution among EU member countries.
Second, as it is most likely impossible to obtain positive direct monetary beneﬁts for all members by
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further integration policies, it becomes particularly important to accentuate the indirect beneﬁts of
such policies. For example, our results show that party support in those countries with largest beneﬁts
from EMU-induced trade is larger than in those countries with smaller beneﬁts. However, the eﬀect
disappears after a certain time. We take this as evidence for the lack of awareness of these indirect
beneﬁts to the general public once they have been taken as granted. Therefore, it becomes particularly
relevant to hint at the existence of these indirect beneﬁts from European integration to maintain party
support. Finally, while the European integration process unquestionably has its historic speciﬁcities,
which can be traced back to experiences during and after World War II, it seems that this process,
after considerable advances, has now arrived to a rather more complicated state of aﬀairs that mean
a turning point for some EU members. This teaches us valuable lessons that can be applied to other
processes of economic integration.
6 Appendix
6.1 Data Processing
Parties’ Electoral Support and Government Participation for 2010 and 2014 are from our own data.
Some data about parties’ ideology is missing in some survey years. We assumed that their position
on general ideology is equal to their ideology quote in the closest survey year. Because of missing
information, 54 observations on parties were not included in our sample. As GINI indexes are rather
time invariant they are not collected annually in all countries and, thus, there is no information for
all years to report Inequality. To prevent the loss of more observations, we estimate missing data by
taking the average of the two closest observations in time.
insert Table Data deﬁnitions and sources around here
insert Table Descriptive statistics around here
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1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2002 2006 2010 2014 1984-2014
Ideology 2.270∗∗∗ 2.541∗∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗ 2.717∗∗∗ 3.608∗∗∗ 2.773∗∗∗ 2.894∗∗∗ 1.637∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗ 2.495∗∗∗
(0.457) (0.334) (0.257) (0.392) (0.621) (0.362) (0.452) (0.294) (0.376) (0.125)
Ideology Squared -0.172∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006)
Mainstream Party -0.056 0.544∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.456∗ 0.417∗ 0.409∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.264) (0.229) (0.234) (0.247) (0.171) (0.208) (0.170) (0.199) (0.076)
EU Net Expenditure -0.301 -0.603∗ -0.443∗ -0.662∗∗ -1.987∗∗∗ -0.632∗ -0.743∗ -0.018 0.192 -0.354∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.241) (0.194) (0.239) (0.306) (0.317) (0.319) (0.181) (0.128) (0.077)
EU Net Expenditure 0.062 0.089+ 0.095∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.166∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.032 -0.030 0.070∗∗∗
× Ideology (0.050) (0.047) (0.032) (0.042) (0.072) (0.068) (0.069) (0.028) (0.025) (0.015)
EMU Trade Beneﬁts 0.171+ 0.112 0.026 0.050 0.092∗
(0.094) (0.081) (0.141) (0.097) (0.042)
EMU Trade Beneﬁts -0.017 0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.014∗
× Ideology (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.007)
Maastricht Non-compliance -0.560 - 0.144 0.399 1.198∗∗ 2.660∗∗∗ 1.853∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.769) (0.511) (0.440) (0.443) (0.781) (0.518) (0.187)
Maastricht Non-compliance 0.145 - 0.139 -0.045 -0.220∗∗ -0.422∗∗ -0.298∗∗ -0.107∗∗
× Ideology (0.139) (0.103) (0.079) (0.077) (0.140) (0.094) (0.035)
Inequality 0.078 0.234∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.184∗ -0.081+ -0.174∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.051) (0.054) (0.069) (0.092) (0.055) (0.074) (0.047) (0.062) (0.021)
Inequality -0.015 -0.025∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.019+ -0.033∗ 0.016+ 0.030∗ -0.017∗∗∗
× Ideology (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004)
Growth Cycle 0.073 -0.261+ 0.435∗ -0.388 0.179 0.232+ -0.055 0.154+ 0.125 0.097∗
(0.164) (0.145) (0.210) (0.467) (0.236) (0.128) (0.089) (0.079) (0.143) (0.039)
Unemployment Cycle 1.694∗∗∗ 0.806 -0.366∗ -0.611 -0.185 -0.027 -0.138 -0.055 -0.059 0.004
(0.412) (0.539) (0.179) (0.648) (0.300) (0.181) (0.165) (0.146) (0.195) (0.045)
Constant -1.943 -5.408∗∗∗ -4.750∗∗ -6.171∗∗∗ -10.484∗∗∗ -2.877 -5.025∗ 1.234 4.212∗ -3.432∗∗∗
(2.222) (1.402) (1.422) (1.691) (2.735) (1.763) (2.289) (1.413) (1.802) (0.611)
Number of parties 117 120 123 131 142 171 188 203 220 1415
Number of countries 14 14 14 14 14 23 24 24 24 24
R-Squared 0.468 0.533 0.620 0.549 0.639 0.605 0.508 0.497 0.487 0.488
Table 1: Determinants of European Integration. OLS estimations. Standard errors are in parentheses. +,*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance
at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively. The full sample estimation model (last column) is clustered by year with 1984 as the
base year. Maasticht Non-compliance in 1996 is excluded as the variable is one for all observations. The complete table with the year
eﬀects is available under request from the authors.
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Variable Measurement Source
European Integration Parties’ position towards European integra-
tion from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly
in favour).
Bakker et al. (2012),
Hooghe et al. (2010),
Polk et al. (2017) and
Ray (1999).
Ideology Parties’ general ideological position from 0
(extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
Bakker et al. (2012),
Hooghe et al. (2010),
Polk et al. (2017) and
Ray (1999).
Mainstream Party Dichotomous variable for parties with a share
of total votes higher than 15% in the last na-
tional government elections before the survey
year in percentage points.
Bakker et al. (2012),
Hooghe et al. (2010),
Polk et al. (2017) and
Ray (1999).
EU Net Expenditure EU expenditure in the country minus national
contributions to the EU budget as a share of






EMU Trade Beneﬁts Beneﬁts from EMUmembership induced trade








Binary variable that takes value 1 when a
country has a government deﬁcit larger than
3% of GDP and/or a government debt larger




OECD (2017) and Euro-
stat (2017).
Inequality GINI index that varies between 0 (perfect
equality) and 100 (perfect inequality).
Eurostat (2017) and
UNU-WIDER (2013).
Growth Cycle Diﬀerence between the country’s annual real
per capita income growth rate and its trend
over the period 1980-2010 (base year for real
per capita income 2010).
Own calculation with
data from OECD (2017)
and WDB (2017).
Unemployment Cycle Diﬀerence between the country’s annual un-
employment rate and its trend over the period
1980-2014.
Own calculation with
data from WDB (2017).
Table A.1: Data deﬁnitions and sources. The measurment of variables refers to the respective survey
year if not indicated otherwise.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
European Integration 4.83 1.80 1 7
Ideology 5.01 2.35 0 10
Mainstream Party 0.30 0.46 0 1
EU Net Expenditure 0.69 1.41 -0.96 6.66
EMU Trade Beneﬁts 0.69 1.41 0 8.28
Maastricht Non-compliance 0.71 0.46 0 1
Inequality 29.31 4.58 20 39
Growth Cycle 0.49 1.31 -3.30 4.85
Unemployment Cycle 0.07 0.84 -1.95 4.85
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Figure 1: Relationship between party support for European integration (European Integration) and
party position over the general left-right ideology spectrum (Ideology) conditional on countries’ EU
net beneﬁts and government debt and inequality position relative to the EU median.
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